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Abstract: 
 
In this study, we analyze why commercial banks failed during the recent financial crisis. We find 
that traditional proxies for the CAMELS components, as well as measures of commercial real 
estate investments, do an excellent job in explaining the failures of banks that were closed during 
2009, just as they did in the previous banking crisis of 1985 – 1992. Surprisingly, we do not find 
that residential mortgage-backed securities played a significant role in determining which banks 
failed and which banks survived. 
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Déjà Vu All Over Again:  
The Causes of U.S. Commercial Banks Failures This Time Around 
 
“It’s only when the tide goes out that you learn who’s been swimming naked.”1 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 Why have U.S. commercial banks failed during the ongoing financial crisis that began in 
early 2008 with the failure of Bear Stearns?  The seemingly obvious answer is that investments 
in the “toxic” residential mortgage-based securities (RMBS), primarily those that were fashioned 
from subprime mortgages, brought them down; but that turns out to be the wrong answer, at least 
for commercial banks.  Certainly, toxic securities were problematic for investment banks and the 
largest commercial banks and their holding companies, but none of these large commercial banks 
have technically failed.2  Yet, in 2009, the FDIC reported that it closed 140 smaller depository 
institutions; and, through June 2010 it closed another 86.  What were the factors that caused 
these failures?  In this study, we provide the answer to this question. 
 There has been little analysis of recent bank failures, primarily because there were so few 
failures during recent years.3  We aim to fill this gap.  Using logistic regressions, we estimate an 
empirical model explaining the determinants of commercial bank failures that occurred during 
                                                 
1 Commonly attributed to Warren Buffet. 
 
2 Of course, in late 2008, some – perhaps many – of these large banks were insolvent on a mark-
to-market basis, and, thus, could be considered to have failed economically. However, the 
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) effectively bailed them out.  Exceptions include the 
demise of Washington Mutual in September 2008 and of Wachovia in October 2008; but, in both 
cases, these banks were absorbed by acquirers at no cost to the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC); and neither was extensively involved in the toxic securities (but, instead, 
had originated bad mortgages that were retained in their loan portfolios). 
 
3 Only 31 banks failed during the eight years spanning 2000 – 2007, and only 30 banks failed 
during 2008. These samples are too small to conduct a meaningful analysis using cross-sectional 
techniques. During 2009, more than 100 banks failed, for the first time since 1992, which was 
the tail end of the last banking crisis. 
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2009, using standard proxies for the CAMELS4 ratings as explanatory variables.  An important 
feature of our analysis is that we estimate alternative models that predict the 2009 failures using 
data from successively earlier years, stretching from 2008 back to 2004.  By so doing, we are 
able to ascertain early indicators of likely difficulties for banks, as well as late indicators.   
 Not surprisingly, we find that traditional proxies for the CAMELS ratings are important 
determinants of bank failures in 2009, just as previous research has shown for the last major 
banking crisis in 1985 – 1992 (see, e.g., Cole and Gunther (1995, 1998)).  Banks with more 
capital, better asset quality, higher earnings, and more liquidity are less likely to fail.  However, 
when we test for early indicators of failure, we find that the CAMELS proxies become 
successively less important, whereas portfolio variables become increasingly important.  In 
particular, real-estate loans play a critically important role in determining which banks survive 
and which banks fail.  Real estate construction and development loans, commercial mortgages, 
and multi-family mortgages are consistently associated with a higher likelihood of bank failure, 
whereas residential single-family mortgages are either neutral or may be associated with a lower 
likelihood of bank failure.  These results are consistent with the findings of Cole and Fenn 
(2008), who examine the role of real estate in explaining bank failures from the 1985 – 1992 
period. 
 The remainder of this study proceeds as follows:  In Section 2, we provide a brief 
literature review.  Section 3 discusses our model and our data, and introduces our explanatory 
                                                 
4 CAMELS is an acronym for Capital adequacy; Asset quality; Management; Earnings; 
Liquidity; and Sensitivity to market risk. The Uniform Financial Rating System, informally 
known as the CAMEL ratings system, was introduced by U.S. regulators in November 1979 to 
assess the health of individual banks. Following an onsite bank examination, bank examiners 
assign a score on a scale of one (best) to five (worst) for each of the five CAMEL components; 
they also assign a single summary measure, known as the “composite” rating. In 1996, CAMEL 
evolved into CAMELS, with the addition of a sixth component to summarize Sensitivity to 
market risk. 
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variables.  In Section 4, we provide our main logit regression results.  Section 5 contains our 
robustness checks, and Section 6 offers a brief conclusion. 
  
2. Literature Review 
 In this section, we will not try to provide a complete literature review on the causes of 
bank failures because recent papers by Torna (2010) and Demyanyk and Hasan (2009) contain 
extensive reviews; we refer interested readers to those studies for further depth. 
 Instead, we wish to make two points:  First, there are surprisingly few papers that have 
econometrically explored the causes of recent bank failures.5  We are aware only of Torna 
(2010),6 who focuses on whether “modern banking activities and techniques”7 are associated 
with commercial banks’ becoming financially troubled and/or insolvent.8  Torna empirically 
tests separately for what causes a healthy bank to become troubled (which is defined as being in 
                                                 
5 We exclude from this category the extensive, and still growing, literature on the failures of the 
subprime-based residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS).  For examples of such analyses, 
see Gorton (2008), Acharya and Richardson (2009), Brunnermeier (2009), Coval et al. (2009), 
Mayer et al. (2009), Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2010), and Krishnamurthy (2010). 
 
6 It is striking that, in the literature reviews provided by Torna (2010) and Demyanyk and Hasan 
(2009), there are no cites to econometric efforts to explain recent bank failures (except with 
respect specifically to RMBS failure issues).  A more recent paper (Forsyth 2010) examines the 
increase in risk-taking (as measured by assets that carry a 100% risk weight in the Basel I risk-
weighting framework) between 2001 and 2007 by banks that are headquartered in the Pacific 
Northwest but does not specifically address failure issues. 
 
7 Torna (2010) considers the following to be “modern banking activities and techniques”: 
brokerage; investment banking; insurance; venture capital; securitization; and derivatives 
trading. 
8 As do we, Torna (2010) excludes thrift institutions from the analysis. 
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the bottom ranks of banks when measured by Tier 1 capital9) and what causes a troubled bank to 
fail (i.e., to become insolvent and have a receivership declared by the FDIC), based on quarte
identifications of troubled banks and failures from Q4-2007 through Q3-2009.  Torna employs 
proportional hazard and conditional logit analyses and uses quarterly FDIC Call Report data for a 
year prior to the quarterly identification.  Torna finds that the influences on a healthy bank’s 
becoming troubled are somewhat different from those that cause a troubled bank to fail. 
rly 
                                                
 For our purposes, Torna’s study is different from ours in at least four important respects: 
First, his study focuses on the distinction between “traditional” and “modern” banking activities, 
but doesn’t explore the finer detail among “traditional” banking activities, such as types of loans, 
which is a central feature of our study.  Second, his study looks back for only a year to find the 
determinants of healthy banks’ becoming troubled and troubled banks’ failing, whereas we look 
back as far as five years prior to the failures.  Third, by including only troubled banks among the 
candidates for failure (which is consistent with the one-year look-back period), his study is 
limited in its ability to consider longer and broader influences, whereas all commercial banks are 
included in our analysis.  Fourth, a ranking based only upon capital ignores five of the six 
CAMELS components and likely seriously misclassifies “problem banks.”  For all of these 
reasons, we do not consider Torna’s study to be a close substitute for ours. 
 The second point that we wish to make in this section concerns the studies of the bank 
and thrift failures of the 1980s and early 1990s – e.g., Cole and Fenn (2008) for commercial 
 
9 Torna (2010) cannot directly identify the banks that are on the FDIC’s “troubled banks” list 
each quarter because the FDIC releases the total number of troubled banks, but keeps their 
identities confidential.  As an estimate of those identities, Torna considers “troubled banks” 
specifically to be the number of banks at the bottom of the Tier 1 capital ranking that is equal to 
the number of banks that are on the FDIC’s “troubled banks” list for each quarter.  Torna’s 
method provides only a crude approximation to these identities because this method ignores all 
but one of the CAMELS components that likely go into the FDIC’s determination of “troubled 
bank” status. 
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banks and Cole, McKenzie, and White (1995) for thrift institutions – that show how commercial 
real estate investments and construction lending have often proved to be significant influences on 
depository institutions’ failures.  In our current study, we find that construction loans continue to 
be a harbinger of failure and that commercial real estate lending and multifamily mortgages, at 
least for earlier years, are significantly associated with bank failures. 
 
3. Model, Data, and Univariate Comparisons 
3.1. Empirical Model. 
In our empirical model of bank failure, the dependent variable FAIL is binary (fail or 
survive), so that it would be inappropriate to use ordinary-least-squares regression (see Maddala 
1983, pp. 15-16).  Consequently, we turn to the multivariate logistic regression model, where we 
assume that Failure*i, 2009 is an unobservable index of the probability that bank i fails during 
2009 and is a function of bank-specific characteristics xt, so that: 
Failure*i, 2009   =   β’ Xi,2009-t  + μi ,  (1) 
where Xi,2009-t are a set of financial characteristics of bank i as of December 31st in the calendar 
year that was t years before 2009, where t ranges from 1 to 5; β is a vector of parameter estimates 
for the explanatory variables, μi  is a random disturbance term, i = 1, 2, . . . , N, where N is the 
number of banks.  Let FAILi, 2009 be an observable variable that is equal to one if Failure*i, 2009 > 
0 and zero if Failure*i, 2009  0.  In this particular application, FAIL,i, 2009 is equal to one if a bank 
fails during 2009 and zero otherwise.  Since Failure*i, 2009 is equal to β’ Xi,2009-t  +  μi, the 
probability that FAILi, 2009 > 0 is equal to the probability that β’ Xi,2009-ti > 0, or, equivalently, the 
probability that (μi > - β’ Xi,2009-t).  Therefore, one can write the probability that FAILi, 2009 is 
equal to one as the probability that (μit > - β’ Xi,2009-t ) , or, equivalently, that Prob(FAILi, 2009 = 1) 
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= 1 - Φ (-β’ Xi,2009-t), where Φ is the cumulative distribution function of ε, here assumed to be 
logistic.  The probability that FAILi, 2009 is equal to zero is then simply Φ (-β’ Xi,2009-t ).  The 
likelihood function L for this model is: 
L   =     [Φ (-β’ Xi,2009-t )]     [1 - Φ (-β’ Xi,2009-t)] , 
                                  FAILi = 0                                           FAILi = 1 
where: 
Φ (-β’ Xi,2009-t) = exp(-β’ Xi,2009-t)  /  [1 - exp(-β’ Xi,2009-t)] = 1  /  [1 + exp(-β’ Xi,2009-t)] 
and  
1 - Φ (-β’ Xi,2009-t ) = exp(-β’ Xi,2009-t)  /  [1 +(-β’ Xi,2009-t )] .   
 There were 117 commercial banks that failed during 2009; but, clearly, there are many 
more banks that will fail during 2010 – 2012 from the same or similar underlying causes.  To 
ignore this latter group is to impose a form of right-hand censoring; but, of course, the identities 
of the banks in this latter group could not be known as of year-end 2009.  Rather than ignore 
them, we estimate their identities as follows:  We count as a “technical failure” any bank 
reporting that the sum of equity plus loan loss reserves was less than half the value of its 
nonperforming assets, or, more formally:    
(Equity + Reserves – 0.5 x NPA) < 0 , 
where NPA equals the sum of loans past due 30-89 days and still accruing interest, loans past 
due 90+ days and still accruing interest, nonaccrual loans, and foreclosed real estate.  Our 
“technical failure” is equivalent to book-value insolvency when a bank is forced to write off half 
the value of its bad loans.  There were 148 such banks as of year-end 2009.10  Thus, we place 
265 (117 + 148) in the FAIL category.11  
                                                 
10 It is worth noting that of the 57 of the 74 commercial banks that failed during the first half of 
2010 (77%) are members of our “technically failed” group. 
 7
 3.2. Data and Explanatory Variables 
 The data that we use come from the FDIC Call Reports.  Because the Call Reports for 
thrifts are different from those used for commercial banks, and because thrifts operate under a 
different charter and are usually focused in directions that are different from those of commercial 
banks, we use only the commercial bank data.12 
 Our explanatory variables are primarily the financial characteristics of the banks, drawn 
from their balance sheets and their profit-and-loss statements as of the fourth quarters of 2008 
and earlier years, that we believe are likely to influence the likelihood of a bank’s failing.  In 
almost all instances, the variables are expressed as a ratio with respect to the bank’s total assets.  
The variable acronyms and full names are provided in Table 1.  Our expectations for these 
variables’ influences are as follows: 
TE (Total Equity):  Since equity is a buffer between the value of the bank’s assets and the value 
of its liabilities, we expect TE to have a negative influence on the likelihood of failure. 
LLR (Loan Loss Reserves):  Since loan loss reserves represent a reduction in assets against 
anticipated losses on specific assets (e.g., a loan), they provide a source of strength against 
subsequent losses.  Consequently, we expect LLR to have a negative influence on bank failures. 
ROA (Return on Assets):  This is, effectively, net income, which we expect to have a negative 
influence on the likelihood of a bank’s failing. 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
11 However, in our logit regressions for 2008 and 2007, there are only 263 banks in the FAIL 
category because two (of the 265 FAIL) banks were denovo start-ups in 2009 and, thus, filed no 
financial data for 2008 or 2007. 
 
12 We also exclude savings banks, even though they use the same Call Report forms as 
commercial banks, because they too are usually focused in directions that are different from 
those of commercial banks. Their inclusion does not qualitatively affect our results. 
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NPA (Non-performing Assets):  Since non-performing assets are likely to be recognized as losses 
in a subsequent period, we expect NPA to have a positive influence on the likelihood of a bank’s 
failing. 
SEC (Securities Held for Investment plus Securities Held for Sale):  Securities (e.g., bonds) have 
traditionally been considered to be safe, low-risk investments for banks – especially since banks 
are prohibited from investing in “speculative” (i.e., “junk”) bonds.  The subprime RMBS debacle 
has shown that not all bonds that are rated as “investment grade” by the major credit rating 
agencies will necessarily remain in that category for very long.  Nevertheless, as a general matter 
we expect this category (which includes the RMBS) to have a negative effect on a bank’s failing, 
especially for smaller banks that generally refrained from purchasing the subprime-based  
RMBS that proved so toxic. 
BD (Brokered Deposits):  These are deposits that are raised through national brokers rather than 
from local customers.  Although there is nothing inherently wrong with a bank’s deciding to 
raise its funds in this way, brokered deposits have traditionally been seen as a way for a bank to 
gather funds and grow quickly; and rapid growth has often been synonymous with risky growth.  
Consequently, we expect this variable to have a positive effect on failure. 
LNSIZE (Log of Bank Total Assets):  Smaller banks, especially younger ones, are generally more 
prone to failure than are larger banks.  On the other hand, larger banks were more likely to have 
invested in the toxic RMBS.  Consequently, though this variable could well be important, it is 
difficult to predict a priori the direction of the influence. 
CASHDUE (Cash & Items Due from Other Banks):  Since this represents a liquid stock of assets, 
we expect it to have a negative effect on failure. 
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GOODWILL (Intangible Assets):  For banks, this largely represents the undepreciated excess 
over book value that a bank paid when acquiring another bank.  Though it can represent 
legitimate franchise value, it can often represent simply the overpayment in an acquisition.  We 
expect it to have a positive influence on a bank’s failing. 
RER14 (Real Estate Residential Single-Family (1-4) Mortgages):  Prior to the current crisis, 
single-family13 residential mortgages were generally considered to be safe, worthwhile loans for 
banks; the failure of millions of subprime mortgages has thrown some doubt on this proposition.  
Because most residential mortgages are not subprime, our general expectation is that RER14 
would have a negative influence on a bank’s failing. 
REMUL (Real Estate Multifamily Mortgages):  Lending on commercial multifamily properties 
has had a history of being troublesome for banks and other lenders (including Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac); consequently, we expect it to have a positive influence on failing. 
RECON (Real Estate Construction & Development Loans):  This is a category of lending that 
has been extraordinarily risky for banks in the past; we expect it to have a positive influence on 
failure. 
RECOM (Real Estate Nonfarm Nonresidential Mortgages): This is a category of commercial real 
estate loans, such as office buildings, and retail malls that proved especially toxic during the 
previous banking crisis. We expect it to be positively related to failure. 
CI (Commercial & Industrial Loans):  This is a category of lending in which commercial banks 
are expected to have a comparative advantage.  We expect it to have a negative influence on 
failure. 
                                                 
13 Almost all U.S. housing statistics lump one-to-four residential units into the single-family 
category. 
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CONS (Consumer Loans):  This encompasses automobile loans, other consumer durables loans, 
and credit card loans, as well as personal unsecured loans.  Again, this is an area where banks 
should have a comparative advantage.  We expect a negative influence on failure.14 
 
3.3. Univariate Comparisons 
 Tables 2A – 2E provides the means and standard errors for all banks and separately for 
the subsamples of surviving banks and failed banks, along with t-tests for statistically significant 
differences in the means of the surviving and failing groups.  Tables 2A – 2E provide descriptive 
statistics for 2008, 2007, 2006, 2005, and 2004, respectively, so that we can see how the 
differences in the two subsamples evolved over the five years prior to the 2009 failures. 
 In Table 2A are the univariate comparisons based upon year-end 2008 Call Report data. 
Not surprisingly, during this period just prior to the 2009 failures, we see that the difference in 
the means of virtually every variable is highly significant and with the expected sign.  Among 
the traditional CAMELS proxies, failing banks have significantly lower capital ratios (0.076 vs. 
0.124), higher ratios of NPAs (0.126 vs. 0.026), lower earnings (-0.026 vs. 0.005), and fewer 
liquid assets (0.045 vs. 0.062 for Cash & Due, 0.106 vs. 0.204 for Securities, and 0.172 vs. 0.043 
for Brokered Deposits).  Of course, this is not surprising, as regulators based their decisions to 
close a bank largely upon the CAMELS rating of the bank, and that rating is closely proxied by 
these variables (see Cornyn, Cole, and Gunther 1995). 
More interesting are the loan portfolio variables, especially those that are related to real 
estate.  Failing banks have significantly higher allocations to commercial real estate of all 
                                                 
14 Other financial variables that we tried, but that generally failed to yield significant results, 
included Trading Assets; Premises; Restructured Loans; Insider Loans; Home Equity Loans; and 
Mortgage-Backed Securities (classified into a number of categories). 
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kinds—most notably to Construction & Development loans (0.232 vs. 0.070), but also to 
Nonfarm Nonresidential Mortgages (0.226 vs. 0.164) and Multifamily Mortgages (0.029 vs. 
0.014).  In contrast, failing banks have significantly lower allocations to Residential Single-
Family Mortgages (0.104 vs. 0.143) and Consumer Loans (0.016 vs. 0.046). 
 In Table 2E are the univariate comparisons based upon 2004 data, which should reflect 
the portfolio allocations that led to the shockingly high rates of NPAs and associated losses 
reflected in ROA and Total Equity found in Table 2A.  Surprisingly, the failed banks had higher 
capital ratios than did the surviving banks back in 2004, although the difference is not 
statistically significant.  Asset quality as measured by NPAs was virtually identical at 0.014. 
Profitability (ROA) was significantly lower for the failed banks (0.007 vs. 0.011) as was 
liquidity (0.036 vs. 0.049 for Cash &Due, 0.140 vs. 0.240 for Securities, and 0.065 vs. 0.019 for 
Brokered Deposits).  However, once again, it is the loan portfolio variables that are most 
interesting.  Even five years before failure, the group of failed banks had much higher 
concentrations of commercial real estate loans (0.171 vs. 0.051 for Construction/Development 
Loans, 0.221 vs. 0.144 for Nonfarm Nonresidential Mortgages, and 0.029 vs. 0.012 for 
Multifamily Mortgages) and much lower concentrations of Residential Single-Family Mortgages 
(0.109 vs. 0.146) and Consumer Loans (0.031 vs. 0.059). 
Table 3 provides a summary of significant differences in means across the five years 
analyzed.  As can be seen, most of the variables across the five time periods are consistently 
associated (positively or negatively) with failures in 2009. 
 One point concerning the comparisons of the results using 2008 data with those that use 
earlier years’ data – whether the simple comparisons of means that are discussed here or the 
multivariate logit results that are discussed in Section 4 – should be stressed:  To the extent that a 
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category of assets from an earlier year generates losses, those losses will reduce (via write-
downs) the magnitude of the assets (cet. par.) in that category in later years.  Thus, if (say) 
investments in construction loans in 2006 lead to large losses in 2008 and the eventual failure of 
banks in 2009, then the regression involving 2006 data will capture the positive effect of 
construction loans on bank failure; but the regression involving 2008 data may fail to find a 
significant effect from construction loans, since the write-downs may be so substantial as to 
make the importance of construction loans (as of 2008) appear to be relatively modest. 
 
4. Logit Regression Results 
 In Table 4 are the results of a set of logistic regression models that provide the main 
results of our study.  In these models, the dependent variable is equal to one if a bank failed 
during 2009 or was technically insolvent (as previously defined) as of year-end 2009; and is 
equal to zero otherwise.  The five pairs of columns present results that are based upon data (i.e., 
explanatory variables) from 2008, 2007, 2006, 2005, and 2004, respectively.  The coefficients in 
the table represent the marginal effect of a change in the relevant independent variable, when all 
variables are evaluated at their means. 
The results in the first pair of columns, which are based upon the financial data reported 
just prior to failure, we find that the standard CAMELS proxies have the expected signs and are 
highly significant.  Lower capital as measured by equity to assets was associated with a higher 
probability of failure, as was worse asset quality as measured by NPAs to assets, lower earnings 
as measured by ROA, and worse liquidity as measured by Cash & Due to assets, Investment 
Securities to assets, and Brokered Deposits to assets.  These results closely follow the univariate 
results presented in Panel A of Table 2.  The loan portfolio variables indicate that failed banks 
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had significantly higher concentrations of Construction & Development loans and significantly 
lower concentrations of Residential Single-Family Mortgages and Consumer Loans.  Overall, 
this model explains more than 60 percent of the variability in the dependent variable as measured 
by the pseudo-R2 statistic (also known as McFadden’s LRI). 
 As we move back in time in the subsequent pairs of columns in Table 4, our explanatory 
power falls off to only 20 percent for the results in the last pair of columns, which are based upon 
2004 data, but we find that most of the explanatory variables that are significant for the 2008 
data retain significance for the 2004 data—five years prior to the observed outcome of failure or 
survival.  Only the capital ratio loses significance.  Moreover, the prominence of the real estate 
loan variables rises as we go back in time, most notably the ratio of Construction & 
Development Loans to total assets. 
 In Table 5, we present a summary of the results in Table 4.  As can be seen, there are six 
variables that are consistently significant for at least four of the five years prior to measurement 
of our outcome of failure or survival.  Two are standard CAMELS proxies: asset quality as 
measured by the ratio of Nonperforming Assets to total assets, and earnings as measured by 
ROA.  Brokered deposits, as an indicator of rapid growth and likely a negative indicator of asset 
quality and of management quality, has a clear negative influence.  The remaining three are real-
estate loan portfolio variables that neatly summarize the underpinnings of not only this banking 
crisis but also the underpinnings of the previous crisis during the 1980s:  High allocations to 
Construction & Development Loans, Nonfarm Nonresidential Mortgages (i.e., commercial real 
estate), and Multifamily Mortgages are strongly associated with failure.15 
                                                 
15 A potential issue of multicollinearity should be mentioned: If the variable Nonfarm 
Nonresidential Mortgages is excluded from the regressions, most of the other variables retain the 
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 Perhaps most notable about Table 5 are the variables that are not significant throughout 
the periods.  Of these, the most striking is the ratio of capital (Total Equity) to assets, which loses 
its explanatory power when we move back more than two years prior to failure.  In contrast, the 
ratio of Loan Loss Reserves to total assets is significant three and more years prior to failure but 
loses its significance during the two years prior to failure.  
 
5. Robustness Checks and Extensions 
 In this section, we provide a set of robustness checks on our basic results, as well as 
extending them in interesting ways.  First, we exclude our technical failures (i.e., we count as 
failures only those banks that actually failed in 2009) and re-estimate our logit models.  Second, 
we exclude the actual failures (i.e., we count as failures only those banks that were technically 
insolvent at the end of 2009, including 57 banks that actually did fail during the first half of 
2010) and re-estimate our logit models. Third, we rerun our logit models excluding banks with 
more than $10 billion in total assets.  Fourth, we split our sample into large and small banks and 
re-estimate our logit models separately for these two groups.  Fifth, we add dummy variables for 
the states that have had the lion’s share of bank failures.  Sixth, we add dummy variables that 
represent the primary federal regulator of the commercial bank.  Seventh, we recalculate our 
technical failures by using a disaggregated measure of non-performing assets with varying loss 
ratios that are applied to the different components.  And eighth, we re-estimate our logit models 
with the inclusion of the actual failures of the actual bank failures in the first half of 2010. 
 
5.1. Exclusion of Technical Failures  
                                                                                                                                                             
signs and significance shown in Table 4, and the variable Residential Single-Family Mortgages 
becomes a consistently significant negative influence on failure. 
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 As was explained above, our FAIL variable includes the banks that actually failed in 
2009 plus our calculation of banks that were likely to fail within the next year or two.  Because 
the latter are estimated, for one robustness check we exclude the technically failed banks, and re-
estimate our model with FAIL encompassing only the banks that actually were closed by the 
FDIC during 2009.  As can be seen in Table 6 and the summary in Table 7, the results for this 
more limited sample of failed banks basically replicate our basic results in Tables 4 and 5.  There 
are, however, some notable differences:  Brokered Deposits do not show up as significant for this 
group; Residential Single-Family Mortgages are generally a negative influence on failure; and 
Nonfarm Nonresidential Mortgages are insignificant.   
 
5.2 Exclusion of Actual Failures 
 In Table 8 we estimate our model with FAIL encompassing only the technically failed 
banks (excluding the banks that were actually closed by the FDIC in 2009), and Table 9 provides 
a summary.  We find that the results again are basically similar to our basic results; but, again, 
there are some differences:  Cash & Due (a liquidity measure) is less important in explaining the 
failures of these banks; and Consumer Loans are wholly insignificant as an influence on failure. 
 
5.3. Exclusion of the Largest Banks 
 It is clear that the largest banks were those that were most likely to have invested in the 
“toxic” RMBS securities.  Perhaps these banks are atypical of the remaining thousands of 
smaller banks and are somehow influencing our results?  As a third robustness check, we exclude 
the 40 banks with more than $10 billion in total assets for each earlier time period from which 
our alternative sets of explanatory variables are drawn.  The results of this exercise, which are 
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available upon request from the authors, basically replicate those shown in Tables 4 and 5. This 
indicates that our results are not driven by the oddities of these large banks. 
 
5.4 Dividing the Sample into Small Banks and Large Banks. 
 In addition to excluding the largest banks, we also divide our overall sample into “small” 
and “large” banks, using $300 million as our demarcation point.  We choose $300 million in 
order to ensure that there are a sufficient number of failures in the “large bank” subsample for 
estimating the logit model. Tables 10 and 12 provide the estimation results for the large and 
small banks, respectively, with Tables 11 and 13 providing summaries of these respective results.  
As can be seen, the basic results hold for both small and large banks, with a few notable 
exceptions.  Specifically, ROA is a weaker negative influence on failures for large banks than for 
small banks; Securities play no role in failures for large banks, whereas they are a significant 
negative influence on failures for small banks; and Nonfarm Nonresidential Mortgages are a 
significant positive influence on failure for only the two years preceding the failures of large 
banks, whereas these commercial mortgages are significant positive influences on failures for 
years two through five prior to failure but not for the year immediately preceding failure for 
small banks. 
 
5.5 Adding State Dummy Variables 
 Casual observation suggests that some states have experienced more extensive numbers 
of bank failures than have others.  To control for this, we include as additional explanatory 
variables a set of indicators (i.e., dummy variables) for these “high volume” states – Arizona, 
California, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Michigan, and Nevada.  We find that indicators for FL, 
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GA, IL, and NV are consistently significant positive influences on failure over all five years of 
data; in addition, CA also is a significant positive influence when only actual failures are 
included in FAIL (i.e., when technical failures are excluded from FAIL).  Importantly, these 
additional variables add to the explanatory power of the regressions, but do not “soak up” 
explanatory power from our basic results of Tables 4 and 5; i.e., the basic story of the CAMELS 
variables and commercial real estate variables continues to hold even when the state dummies 
are included. (These results are available from the authors upon request.) 
 
5.6 Adding Dummy Variables for the Primary Regulator 
 Commercial banks in the U.S. are prudentially regulated by one of three federal 
regulators:  National banks are regulated by the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC); state-
chartered banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System (FRS) are regulated by the 
Federal Reserve; and state-chartered banks that are not members of the FRS are regulated by the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).16  It is possible that the different regulatory 
regimes might have had different influences on the likelihoods of failures.  To test this 
possibility, we include dummy variables for the OCC and FDIC regulatory regimes in our logit 
regressions.  We find significant positive effects on failures for the OCC variable for the 2007 
and 2008 explanatory data.  Our basic results for the remaining variables from Tables 4 and 5 
continue to hold. (Again, these results are available from the authors upon request) 
 
                                                 
16 Also, all bank holding companies are regulated by the FRS, but not all banks are members of 
holding companies. 
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5.7 Disaggregating Non-Performing Assets 
 In our basic results, we describe a technical failure as a bank that did not fail during 2009 
but that had at year-end 2009: 
(Equity + Reserves – 0.5*NPA) < 0. 
Since there are a number of components to NPA, as an additional robustness check we 
explore the possibility of applying different “haircuts” (i.e., percentage estimates of loss) to the 
different components.  Specifically, we apply a haircut of 20% to loans that were past due 30-89 
days and still accruing interest (PD3089), a haircut of 50% to loans that were past due 90+ days 
and still accruing interest (PD90+), and a haircut of 100% (i.e., a total writeoff) to nonaccrual 
loans (NonAccrual) and to other real estate owned (OREO).  We then redefined technical 
failures as 
 Equity + Reserves – 0.2*PD3089 – 0.5*PD90+ – 1.0*(NonAccrual + OREO) < 0. 
At the end of 2009 there were 347 banks that satisfied this modified definition of technical 
failure.17  When we include these modified technical failures in our measure of FAIL and re-
estimate our basic logit regressions, our basic results continue to hold. (Again, these results are 
available from the authors on request) 
 
5.8 Including the Failed Banks from the First Half of 2010 
 There were 74 commercial banks that failed during the first half of 2010.  When we 
include these banks in FAIL and re-estimate our logit regressions, our basic results continue to 
hold. This is not surprising, as 57 of these 74 were members of our technically insolvent failures. 
(Again, these results are available from the authors on request) 
                                                 
17 Of the 74 banks that failed in the first half of 2010, 68 (92%) were in this modified group of 
347 technical failures. 
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 5.9 Miscellaneous Additional Robustness Tests 
 In addition to the robustness checks described above, we tested a number of additional 
modifications to our explanatory variables, but failed to find significant results.  These included: 
home equity loans; annual percentage growth of assets; a dummy variable for RECOM > 300% 
of equity; a dummy variable for RECON > 100% of equity; squared terms for RECOM, 
RECON, and REMUL; advances from the Federal Home Loan Bank System as a percentage of 
assets; and separate categories of charge-offs corresponding to consumer, C&I, and various 
categories of real estate loans.18 
 
6. Conclusion 
 In this paper we address the question, “what have been the financial characteristics of 
commercial banks in earlier years that led to their failure or expected failure in 2009?”  Using 
logit analysis on alternative explanatory data sets drawn from 2008, 2007, etc., back to 2004, we 
find that traditional proxies for the CAMELS ratings are important determinants of bank failures 
in 2009, just as they were during the last banking crisis, which spanned 1985 – 1992.   
Our results suggest that the number of bank failures will continue at elevated levels for 
several years, just as they did during the last crisis.  We also find that real estate loans play an 
especially important role in determining which banks survive and which banks fail.  Banks with 
higher loan allocations to construction and development loans, commercial mortgages, and 
multi-family mortgages are especially likely to fail, whereas higher loan allocations to residential 
single-family mortgages are either neutral or may help banks survive. Surprisingly, investments 
                                                 
18 We are grateful to seminar participants at the Federal Reserve Board for many of these 
suggestions and to Scott Frame for the suggestion regarding FHLB advances. 
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in mortgage-backed securities appear to have little or no impact on the likelihood of failure.  In 
fact, banks with higher allocations to investment securities of all kinds are significantly less 
likely to fail. 
 These results are important for at least two reasons:  First, they offer support for the 
CAMELS approach to judging the safety and soundness of commercial banks.  And, second, 
they indicate that most banks in the current crisis are failing in ways that are quite recognizable 
to anyone who went through the bank failure episode of the 1980s and early 1990s. 
Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose… 
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Table 1:  
Variable Acronyms and Explanations 
 
All variables are expressed as a portion of total assets. 
 
TE  Total Equity 
 
LLR  Loan Loss Reserves 
 
ROA  Net Income 
 
NPA  Non-performing Assets = sum of (PD3089, PD90+, NonAccrual, OREO): 
 
PD3089 Loans Past Due 30-89 Days but Still Accruing Interest 
PD90+  Loans Past Due 90+ Days but Still Accruing Interest 
NonAccrual Nonaccrual Loans 
OREO  Other Real Estate Owned 
 
SEC  Securities Held for Investment plus Securities Available for Sale 
 
BD  Brokered Deposits 
 
LNSIZE Log of Bank Total Assets 
 
CASHDUE Cash & Due 
 
GOODWILL Intangible Assets: Goodwill 
 
RER14 Real Estate Residential Single-Family (1–4) Family Mortgages 
 
REHEQ Real Estate Home Equity Loans 
 
REMUL Real Estate Multifamily Mortgages 
 
RECON Real Estate Construction & Development Loans 
 
RECOM    Real Estate Nonfarm Nonresidential Mortgages 
 
CI  Commercial & Industrial Loans 
 
CONS  Consumer Loans 
 
INSIDER Loans to Insiders 
           
Table 2A: 
Descriptive Statistics for 2008 Data  
 Descriptive statistics for variables used to explain the determinants of bank failures. Statistics 
are presented for all banks and separately for surviving banks and failed banks. A t-test for 
significant differences in the means of the surviving banks and failed banks appears in the last 
column. FAIL takes on a value of one if a bank failed during 2009 or was technically insolvent at 
the end of 2009, and a value of zero otherwise. Explanatory variables are defined in Table 1. 
There are 263 failures and 6,883 survivors when we use year-end 2008 data; 263 failures and 
7,092 survivors when we use year-end 2007 data; 258 failures and 7,138 survivors when we use 
year-end 2006 data; 245 failures and 7,276 survivors when we use year-end 2005 data; and 232 
failures and 7,397 survivors when we use year-end 2004 data. The 263 failures include 117 
banks that were closed by the FDIC during 2009 and 148 banks that were technically insolvent at 
the end of 2009 (minus 2 denovo banks that began operations in 2009). Technical insolvency is 
defined as (TE + LLR) < (0.5 x NPA). *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 
0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
 
Variable Mean S.E. Mean S.E. Mean S.E. Difference t-Difference
TE 0.123 0.001 0.124 0.001 0.076 0.002 0.048 22.67 ***
LLR 0.010 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.020 0.001 -0.011 -12.71 ***
ROA 0.004 0.000 0.005 0.000 -0.026 0.002 0.031 14.98 ***
NPA 0.030 0.000 0.026 0.000 0.126 0.005 -0.099 -20.41 ***
SEC 0.200 0.002 0.204 0.002 0.106 0.005 0.097 18.41 ***
BD 0.048 0.001 0.043 0.001 0.172 0.010 -0.129 -13.44 ***
LNSIZE 11.925 0.016 11.899 0.017 12.593 0.074 -0.694 -9.14 ***
CASHDUE 0.062 0.001 0.062 0.001 0.045 0.003 0.018 5.74 ***
GOODWILL 0.005 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.003 3.84 ***
RER14 0.142 0.001 0.143 0.001 0.104 0.005 0.039 6.93 ***
REMUL 0.015 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.029 0.003 -0.015 -5.43 ***
RECON 0.076 0.001 0.070 0.001 0.232 0.008 -0.162 -21.09 ***
RECOM 0.166 0.001 0.164 0.001 0.226 0.007 -0.062 -9.28 ***
C&I 0.100 0.001 0.100 0.001 0.092 0.004 0.008 1.77 *
CONS 0.045 0.001 0.046 0.001 0.016 0.001 0.030 18.75 ***
Obs 7,146       6,883       263          
All Survivors Failures
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Table 2B: 
Descriptive Statistics for 2007 Data  
 Descriptive statistics for variables used to explain the determinants of bank failures. Statistics 
are presented for all banks and separately for surviving banks and failed banks. A t-test for 
significant differences in the means of the surviving banks and failed banks appears in the last 
column. FAIL takes on a value of one if a bank failed during 2009 or was technically insolvent at 
the end of 2009, and a value of zero otherwise. Explanatory variables are defined in Table 1. 
There are 263 failures and 6,883 survivors when we use year-end 2008 data; 263 failures and 
7,092 survivors when we use year-end 2007 data; 258 failures and 7,138 survivors when we use 
year-end 2006 data; 245 failures and 7,276 survivors when we use year-end 2005 data; and 232 
failures and 7,397 survivors when we use year-end 2004 data. The 263 failures include 117 
banks that were closed by the FDIC during 2009 and 148 banks that were technically insolvent at 
the end of 2009 (minus 2 denovo banks that began operations in 2009). Technical insolvency is 
defined as (TE + LLR) < (0.5 x NPA). *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 
0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
 
Variable Mean S.E. Mean S.E. Mean S.E. Difference t-Difference
TE 0.132 0.001 0.133 0.001 0.105 0.003 0.028 9.68 ***
LLR 0.0086 0.000 0.0085 0.000 0.0116 0.000 -0.003 -8.12 ***
ROA 0.0097 0.000 0.0099 0.000 0.0043 0.001 0.006 6.49 ***
NPA 0.019 0.000 0.018 0.000 0.047 0.003 -0.029 -11.18 ***
SEC 0.204 0.002 0.207 0.002 0.112 0.005 0.095 16.41 ***
BD 0.034 0.001 0.030 0.001 0.127 0.008 -0.097 -11.54 ***
LNSIZE 11.848 0.016 11.823 0.016 12.533 0.075 -0.710 -9.23 ***
CASHDUE 0.048 0.001 0.049 0.001 0.027 0.002 0.021 10.81 ***
GOODWILL 0.006 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.006 0.001 0.000 -0.13  
RER14 0.136 0.001 0.138 0.001 0.093 0.005 0.045 8.47 ***
REMUL 0.013 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.027 0.003 -0.015 -5.57 ***
RECON 0.085 0.001 0.077 0.001 0.280 0.010 -0.203 -20.86 ***
RECOM 0.154 0.001 0.152 0.001 0.217 0.007 -0.065 -9.76 ***
CI 0.102 0.001 0.102 0.001 0.097 0.005 0.005 1.08  
CONS 0.048 0.001 0.049 0.001 0.018 0.001 0.031 19.18 ***
Obs. 7,355       7,092       263
All Banks Survivors Failures
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Table 2C: 
Descriptive Statistics for 2006 Data 
 Descriptive statistics for variables used to explain the determinants of bank failures. Statistics 
are presented for all banks and separately for surviving banks and failed banks. A t-test for 
significant differences in the means of the surviving banks and failed banks appears in the last 
column. FAIL takes on a value of one if a bank failed during 2009 or was technically insolvent at 
the end of 2009, and a value of zero otherwise. Explanatory variables are defined in Table 1. 
There are 263 failures and 6,883 survivors when we use year-end 2008 data; 263 failures and 
7,092 survivors when we use year-end 2007 data; 258 failures and 7,138 survivors when we use 
year-end 2006 data; 245 failures and 7,276 survivors when we use year-end 2005 data; and 232 
failures and 7,397 survivors when we use year-end 2004 data. The 263 failures include 117 
banks that were closed by the FDIC during 2009 and 148 banks that were technically insolvent at 
the end of 2009 (minus 2 denovo banks that began operations in 2009). Technical insolvency is 
defined as (TE + LLR) < (0.5 x NPA). *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 
0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
 
Variable Mean S.E. Mean S.E. Mean S.E. Difference t-Difference
TE 0.122 0.001 0.122 0.001 0.123 0.006 0.000 -0.04
LLR 0.009 0.000 0.0086 0.000 0.0093 0.000 -0.001 -3.69 ***
ROA 0.010 0.000 0.0101 0.000 0.0074 0.001 0.003 2.89 ***
NPA 0.014 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.018 0.001 -0.004 -2.77 ***
SEC 0.210 0.002 0.213 0.002 0.117 0.006 0.096 15.86 ***
BD 0.033 0.001 0.031 0.001 0.108 0.008 -0.077 -9.71 ***
LNSIZE 11.823 0.016 11.803 0.016 12.379 0.080 -0.576 -7.06 ***
CASHDUE 0.046 0.001 0.046 0.001 0.034 0.003 0.012 4.23 ***
GOODWILL 0.005 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.005 0.001 0.000 0.25  
RER14 0.139 0.001 0.141 0.001 0.091 0.005 0.050 9.17 ***
REMUL 0.012 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.027 0.003 -0.015 -5.24 ***
RECON 0.080 0.001 0.073 0.001 0.255 0.010 -0.182 -18.20 ***
RECOM 0.152 0.001 0.150 0.001 0.213 0.007 -0.063 -8.98 ***
CI 0.100 0.001 0.100 0.001 0.098 0.005 0.002 0.50  
CONS 0.051 0.001 0.052 0.001 0.020 0.002 0.032 16.01 ***
Obs. 7,396       7,138       258          
All Banks Survivors Failures
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Table 2D: 
Descriptive Statistics for 2005 Data 
 Descriptive statistics for variables used to explain the determinants of bank failures. Statistics 
are presented for all banks and separately for surviving banks and failed banks. A t-test for 
significant differences in the means of the surviving banks and failed banks appears in the last 
column. FAIL takes on a value of one if a bank failed during 2009 or was technically insolvent at 
the end of 2009, and a value of zero otherwise. Explanatory variables are defined in Table 1. 
There are 263 failures and 6,883 survivors when we use year-end 2008 data; 263 failures and 
7,092 survivors when we use year-end 2007 data; 258 failures and 7,138 survivors when we use 
year-end 2006 data; 245 failures and 7,276 survivors when we use year-end 2005 data; and 232 
failures and 7,397 survivors when we use year-end 2004 data. The 263 failures include 117 
banks that were closed by the FDIC during 2009 and 148 banks that were technically insolvent at 
the end of 2009 (minus 2 denovo banks that began operations in 2009). Technical insolvency is 
defined as (TE + LLR) < (0.5 x NPA). *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 
0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
 
Variable Mean S.E. Mean S.E. Mean S.E. Difference t-Difference
TE 0.117 0.001 0.117 0.001 0.120 0.006 -0.003 -0.44
LLR 0.009 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.000 -1.86 *
ROA 0.010 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.008 0.001 0.003 2.72 ***
NPA 0.013 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.013 0.001 0.000 0.24
SEC 0.223 0.002 0.227 0.002 0.129 0.006 0.098 14.55 ***
BD 0.034 0.008 0.033 0.008 0.086 0.007 -0.053 -4.90 ***
LNSIZE 11.767 0.016 11.751 0.016 12.244 0.082 -0.493 -5.91 ***
CASHDUE 0.048 0.001 0.049 0.001 0.035 0.002 0.014 6.75 ***
GOODWILL 0.005 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.002 2.09 **
RER14 0.142 0.001 0.143 0.001 0.102 0.006 0.041 6.81 ***
REMUL 0.012 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.029 0.004 -0.017 -4.70 ***
RECON 0.068 0.001 0.063 0.001 0.211 0.010 -0.147 -15.38 ***
RECOM 0.150 0.001 0.147 0.001 0.221 0.007 -0.073 -9.68 ***
CI 0.100 0.001 0.100 0.001 0.100 0.005 0.000 -0.04  
CONS 0.054 0.001 0.055 0.001 0.023 0.002 0.032 13.96 ***
Obs. 7,521       7,256       245
All Banks Survivors Failures
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Table 2E: 
Descriptive Statistics for 2004 Data 
Descriptive statistics for variables used to explain the determinants of bank failures. Statistics are 
presented for all banks and separately for surviving banks and failed banks. A t-test for 
significant differences in the means of the surviving banks and failed banks appears in the last 
column. FAIL takes on a value of one if a bank failed during 2009 or was technically insolvent at 
the end of 2009, and a value of zero otherwise. Explanatory variables are defined in Table 1. 
There are 263 failures and 6,883 survivors when we use year-end 2008 data; 263 failures and 
7,092 survivors when we use year-end 2007 data; 258 failures and 7,138 survivors when we use 
year-end 2006 data; 245 failures and 7,276 survivors when we use year-end 2005 data; and 232 
failures and 7,397 survivors when we use year-end 2004 data. The 263 failures include 117 
banks that were closed by the FDIC during 2009 and 148 banks that were technically insolvent at 
the end of 2009 (minus 2 denovo banks that began operations in 2009). Technical insolvency is 
defined as (TE + LLR) < (0.5 x NPA). *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 
0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
 
Variable Mean S.E. Mean S.E. Mean S.E. Difference t-Difference
TE 0.114 0.001 0.114 0.001 0.118 0.007 -0.004 -0.51
LLR 0.009 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.000 -1.26
ROA 0.010 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.007 0.001 0.003 3.15 ***
NPA 0.014 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.014 0.001 0.000 0.17
SEC 0.237 0.002 0.240 0.002 0.140 0.007 0.099 14.34 ***
BD 0.021 0.001 0.019 0.001 0.065 0.007 -0.045 -6.54 ***
LNSIZE 11.707 0.015 11.696 0.015 12.079 0.083 -0.383 -4.54 ***
CASHDUE 0.049 0.001 0.049 0.001 0.036 0.002 0.013 5.51 ***
GOODWILL 0.004 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.001 1.86 *
RER14 0.145 0.001 0.146 0.001 0.109 0.006 0.037 5.75 ***
REMUL 0.012 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.029 0.004 -0.017 -4.63 ***
RECON 0.056 0.001 0.052 0.001 0.171 0.009 -0.118 -13.60 ***
RECOM 0.147 0.001 0.144 0.001 0.221 0.008 -0.077 -9.71 ***
CI 0.100 0.001 0.099 0.001 0.109 0.006 -0.009 -1.64  
CONS 0.058 0.001 0.059 0.001 0.031 0.003 0.028 8.57 ***
Obs. 7,629       7,397       232
All Banks Survivors Failures
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Table 3:  
Summary of Univariate Comparisons of Failed and Surviving Banks 
The results of t-tests on the differences in the means of the explanatory variables for earlier years 
with respect to the 2009 Failure and Survivor sub-samples shown in Table 2; +,- indicate 
significant differences at the 10% level of significance or stronger. + indicates that the mean for 
surviving banks is greater than the mean for failing banks, and – indicates that the mean for 
surviving banks is less than the mean for failing banks. 
 
Variable 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004
TE + +
LLR - - - -
ROA + + + + +
NPA - - -  
SEC + + + + +
BD - - - - -
LNSIZE - - - - -
CASHDUE + + + + +
GOODWILL + +
RER14 + + + + +
REMUL - - - - -
RECON - - - - -
RECOM - - - - -
CI +  
CONS + + + + +
+
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Table 4:  
Logistic Regression Results: All Banks 
Results from estimating a logistic regression model to explain determinants of bank failures, where the dependent variable FAIL takes 
on a value of one if a bank failed during 2009 or was technically insolvent at the end of 2009, and a value of zero otherwise. 
Explanatory variables are defined in Table 1. There are 263 failures and 6,883 survivors when we use year-end 2008 data; 263 failures 
and 7,092 survivors when we use year-end 2007 data; 258 failures and 7,138 survivors when we use year-end 2006 data; 245 failures 
and 7,276 survivors when we use year-end 2005 data; and 232 failures and 7,397 survivors when we use year-end 2004 data. The 263 
failures include 117 banks that were closed by the FDIC during 2009 and 148 banks that were technically insolvent at the end of 2009 
(minus 2 denovo banks that began operations in 2009). Technical insolvency is defined as (TE + LLR) < (0.5 x NPA). *, ** and *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
Marginal Marginal Marginal Marginal Marginal
Variable Effect t-stat  Effect t-stat  Effect t-stat  Effect t-stat  Effect t-stat  
TE -1.08 -11.33 *** -0.25 -3.86 *** 0.00 0.02 0.00 -0.10 0.05 2.08 **
LLR -0.21 -0.90 -0.65 -1.34 -1.95 -3.10 *** -2.04 -3.14 *** -1.69 -2.70 ***
ROA -0.22 -3.42 *** -0.36 -2.66 *** -0.46 -3.91 *** -0.57 -3.48 *** -0.26 -2.29 **
NPA 0.50 12.43 *** 0.50 7.17 *** 0.65 6.35 *** 0.54 4.34 *** 0.39 3.09 ***
SEC -0.08 -3.22 *** 0.02 0.54 -0.02 -0.73 -0.05 -1.92 * -0.05 -2.08 **
BD 0.06 4.83 *** 0.07 4.53 *** 0.06 3.69 *** 0.00 1.00 0.07 4.05 ***
LNSIZE 0.00 -0.52 0.00 0.61 0.00 2.23 ** 0.00 1.99 ** 0.00 1.40
CASHDUE -0.10 -2.47 ** -0.02 -0.21 0.00 -0.09 -0.21 -2.73 *** -0.10 -1.67 *
GOODWILL 0.91 5.90 *** 0.21 1.67 * -0.16 -1.41 -0.38 -2.24 ** -0.31 -1.96 *
RER14 -0.09 -3.65 *** -0.02 -0.64 -0.05 -1.59 -0.04 -1.45 -0.03 -1.26
REMUL 0.04 1.17 0.16 3.74 *** 0.17 3.80 *** 0.15 3.92 *** 0.17 4.10 ***
RECON 0.10 5.00 *** 0.23 9.30 *** 0.24 10.90 *** 0.23 10.63 *** 0.22 10.46 ***
RECOM -0.01 -0.49 0.08 3.01 *** 0.07 2.86 *** 0.06 2.64 *** 0.05 2.43 **
CI -0.07 -2.31 ** 0.01 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.03 0.01 0.36
CONS -0.08 -1.26 -0.16 -1.75 * -0.19 -2.19 ** -0.18 -2.35 ** -0.07 -1.40
Pseudo-R2 0.621 0.349 0.281 0.236 0.206
Failures 263              263              258              245              232              
Obs. 7,146           7,355           7,396           7,521           7,628           
20042008 2007 2006 2005
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Table 5:  
Summary of Significant Results from Table 4 
Logistic Regression Results: All Banks 
 
+,- indicate significant (at the 10% level or stronger) positive or negative regression coefficients from the logistic regressions in 
Table 4. + indicates a positive relation with the probability of failure and – indicates a negative relation with the probability of failure. 
 
Variable 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004
TE - - +
LLR - - -
ROA - - - - -
NPA + + + + +
SEC - - -
BD + + +  +
LNSIZE + +
CASHDUE -   - -
GOODWILL + +  - -
RER14 -
REMUL + + + +
RECON + + + + +
RECOM + + + +
CI -   
CONS - - -
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Table 6:  
Logistic Regression Results: FDIC Closed Banks Only 
Results from estimating a logistic regression model to explain determinants of bank failures, where the dependent variable FAIL takes 
on a value of one if a bank failed (i.e., was closed by the FDIC) during 2009, and a value of zero otherwise. Explanatory variables are 
defined in Table 1. There are 117 failures and 6,883 survivors when we use year-end 2008 data; 117 failures and 7,092 survivors when 
we use year-end 2007 data; 114 failures and 7,138 survivors when we use year-end 2006 data; 111 failures and 7,276 survivors when 
we use year-end 2005 data; and 106 failures and 7,396 survivors when we use year-end 2004 data. *, ** and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
2008 2007  
Marginal Marginal Marginal Marginal Marginal
Variable Effect t-stat  Effect t-stat  Effect t-stat  Effect t-stat  Effect t-stat  
TE -0.62 -9.54 *** -0.16 -2.94 *** -0.01 -0.55 -0.04 -1.43 0.03 1.70 *
LLR 0.03 0.22 -0.45 -1.30 -1.03 -2.26 ** -1.03 -2.17 ** -1.34 -2.80 ***
ROA -0.12 -3.62 *** -0.07 -0.75 -0.18 -2.44 ** -0.40 -3.18 *** -0.09 -1.42
NPA 0.17 7.21 *** 0.27 5.83 *** 0.35 5.14 *** 0.20 1.91 * 0.26 3.00 ***
SEC -0.04 -2.59 *** 0.01 0.38 0.00 -0.28 -0.01 -0.47 -0.02 -1.17
BD 0.01 1.37 0.02 1.28 0.01 0.71 0.00 0.56 0.02 1.57
LNSIZE 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.98 0.00 2.15 ** 0.00 1.49 0.00 1.27
CASHDUE -0.05 -2.25 ** -0.20 -2.31 ** -0.26 -2.85 *** -0.21 -2.99 *** -0.20 -2.87 ***
GOODWILL 0.60 6.63 *** 0.19 2.36 ** 0.01 0.11 -0.03 -0.39 -0.09 -1.04
RER14 -0.06 -4.19 *** -0.05 -2.14 ** -0.04 -1.95 * -0.03 -1.41 -0.03 -1.82 *
REMUL 0.03 1.59 0.07 2.68 *** 0.06 2.16 ** 0.08 3.14 *** 0.10 4.19 ***
RECON 0.04 2.96 *** 0.08 5.07 *** 0.09 6.33 *** 0.10 7.09 *** 0.10 7.73 ***
RECOM -0.01 -0.74 0.01 0.90 0.02 1.12 0.02 1.13 0.01 0.77
CI -0.04 -2.19 ** -0.01 -0.64 -0.02 -0.88 -0.02 -0.87 -0.01 -0.46
CONS -0.03 -0.71 -0.19 -2.35 ** -0.26 -3.14 *** -0.19 -2.67 *** -0.06 -1.43
Pseudo-R2 0.690 0.321 0.255 0.227 0.205
Failures 117         117         114         111         106         
Survivors 6,883      7,092      7,138      7,276      7,396      
Obs. 7,000      7,209      7,252      7,387      7,502      
2006 2005 2004
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Table 7 
Summary of Significant Results from Table 6 
Logistic Regression Results: FDIC Closed Banks Only 
 
+,- indicate significant (at the 10% level or stronger) positive or negative regression coefficients from the logistic regressions in 
Table 6. + indicates a positive relation with the probability of failure and – indicates a negative relation with the probability of failure. 
 
Variable 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004
TE - - +
LLR - - -
ROA -  - -  
NPA + + + + +
SEC -     
BD      
LNSIZE +
CASHDUE - - - - -
GOODWILL + +  
RER14 - - - -
REMUL + + + +
RECON + + + + +
RECOM
CI -   
CONS - - -
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Table 8:  
Logistic Regression Results: Technically Insolvent Banks Only 
Results from estimating a logistic regression model to explain determinants of bank failures, where the dependent variable FAIL takes 
on a value of one if a bank was technically insolvent at the end of 2009, and a value of zero otherwise. (Banks that were closed by the 
FDIC during 2009 are excluded.) Explanatory variables are defined in Table 1. There are 147 failures and 6,882 survivors when we 
use year-end 2008 data; 146 failures and 7,092 survivors when we use year-end 2007 data; 144 failures and 7,138 survivors when we 
use year-end 2006 data; 134 failures and 7,276 survivors when we use year-end 2005 data; and 125 failures and 7,396 survivors when 
we use year-end 2004 data. Technical insolvency is defined as (TE + LLR) < (0.5 x NPA). *, ** and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
 
Marginal Marginal Marginal Marginal Marginal
Variable Effect t-stat  Effect t-stat  Effect t-stat  Effect t-stat  Effect t-stat  
TE -0.65 -7.97 *** -0.12 -2.59 *** -0.01 -0.32 0.02 0.96 0.01 0.52
LLR -0.45 -2.08 ** -0.38 -0.90 -0.84 -1.78 * -1.14 -2.39 ** -0.50 -1.18
ROA -0.11 -1.64 -0.24 -2.34 ** -0.30 -2.79 *** -0.22 -1.90 * -0.17 -2.13 **
NPA 0.40 11.26 *** 0.19 3.46 *** 0.30 3.82 *** 0.35 4.10 *** 0.15 1.57
SEC -0.07 -2.81 *** 0.00 -0.07 -0.03 -1.17 -0.05 -2.62 *** -0.04 -2.04 **
BD 0.05 5.00 *** 0.04 3.55 *** 0.04 3.10 *** 0.00 0.78 0.05 3.62 ***
LNSIZE 0.00 -0.48 0.00 -0.02 0.00 1.16 0.00 1.61 0.00 0.76
CASHDUE -0.09 -2.25 ** 0.06 1.26 0.05 1.64 -0.06 -1.18 0.00 -0.06
GOODWILL 0.49 3.13 *** -0.03 -0.27 -0.29 -1.91 * -0.60 -2.52 ** -0.30 -1.76 *
RER14 -0.04 -2.01 ** 0.04 1.30 -0.01 -0.41 -0.02 -0.78 0.00 -0.20
REMUL 0.01 0.23 0.10 2.60 *** 0.10 2.69 *** 0.07 2.20 ** 0.05 1.15
RECON 0.08 4.55 *** 0.17 7.71 *** 0.15 8.59 *** 0.13 8.20 *** 0.12 7.51 ***
RECOM 0.00 -0.09 0.08 3.51 *** 0.05 2.87 *** 0.04 2.47 ** 0.04 2.56 **
CI -0.04 -1.43 0.03 1.06 0.02 0.93 0.01 0.63 0.02 0.99
CONS -0.06 -0.96 -0.01 -0.19 -0.02 -0.34 -0.04 -0.88 -0.02 -0.66
Pseudo R2 0.621 0.314 0.269 0.220 0.186
Failures 147 146 144 134 126
Survivors 6,882       7,092       7,138        7,276       7,396       
Obs. 7,029        7,238         7,282          7,410         7,522         
20042008 2007 2006 2005
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Table 9: 
Summary of Significant Results from Table 8 
Logistic Regression Results: Technically Insolvent Banks Only 
 
+,- indicate significant (at the 10% level or stronger) positive or negative regression coefficients from the logistic regressions in 
Table 8. + indicates a positive relation with the probability of failure and – indicates a negative relation with the probability of failure. 
 
Variable 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004
TE - - +
LLR - - -
ROA - - - -
NPA + + + + +
SEC -   - -
BD + + +  +
LNSIZE
CASHDUE -
GOODWILL + +  
RER14 -
REMUL + + + +
RECON + + + + +
RECOM + + + +
CI   
CONS
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Table 10:  
Logistic Regression Results: Banks with More than $300 Million in Total Assets 
Results from estimating a logistic regression model to explain determinants of bank failures, where the dependent variable FAIL takes 
on a value of one if a bank failed during 2009 or was technically insolvent at the end of 2009, and a value of zero otherwise. 
Explanatory variables are defined in Table 1. There are 114 failures and 1,652 survivors when we use year-end 2008 data; 116 failures 
and 1,624 survivors when we use year-end 2007 data; 111 failures and 1,584 survivors when we use year-end 2006 data; 88 failures 
and 1,513 survivors when we use year-end 2005 data; and 66 failures and 1,422 survivors when we use year-end 2004 data. Technical 
insolvency is defined as (TE + LLR) < (0.5 x NPA). *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, 
respectively. 
 
Marginal Marginal Marginal Marginal Marginal
Variable Effect t-stat  Effect t-stat  Effect t-stat  Effect t-stat  Effect t-stat  
TE -2.29 -7.72 *** -0.69 -2.04 ** -0.37 -1.30 0.16 0.72 0.00 0.03
LLR -0.41 -0.69 -2.63 -1.76 * -3.06 -1.29 -2.11 -1.07 -2.94 -1.71 *
ROA -0.32 -2.23 ** 0.59 1.27 -1.09 -2.74 *** -2.92 -3.55 *** -0.30 -0.48
NPA 0.89 7.76 *** 0.94 3.98 *** 1.02 2.53 ** 1.18 2.35 ** 1.33 3.27 ***
SEC -0.05 -0.63 0.13 1.44 0.08 0.91 -0.01 -0.11 -0.03 -0.56
BD 0.07 2.52 ** 0.13 3.02 *** 0.10 2.31 ** 0.04 1.06 0.00 0.03
LNSIZE 0.00 0.42 0.01 1.27 0.01 0.89 0.01 1.69 * 0.01 1.86 *
CASHDUE 0.03 0.27 -0.11 -0.38 0.13 0.66 -0.60 -2.00 ** -0.57 -1.85 *
GOODWILL 2.15 5.36 *** 0.48 1.10 -0.26 -0.56 -1.59 -2.59 *** -1.06 -1.92 *
RER14 0.04 0.52 0.03 0.30 -0.08 -0.73 -0.18 -1.87 * -0.18 -2.26 **
REMUL 0.13 1.56 0.28 2.47 ** 0.27 2.42 ** 0.17 1.90 * 0.15 1.90 *
RECON 0.31 4.10 *** 0.47 5.46 *** 0.49 5.61 *** 0.39 5.68 *** 0.34 5.55 ***
RECOM 0.13 1.85 * 0.16 1.81 * 0.14 1.51 0.06 0.91 0.02 0.35
CI 0.03 0.37 -0.09 -0.76 -0.13 -1.06 -0.24 -2.13 ** -0.26 -2.41 **
CONS -0.05 -0.26 -0.37 -1.27 -0.47 -1.58 -0.40 -1.75 * -0.08 -0.82
Pseudo-R2 0.684 0.315 0.291 0.316 0.293
Failures 114         116         111         88           66           
Survivors 1,652      1,624      1,584      1,513      1,422      
Obs. 1,766      1,740      1,695      1,601      1,488      
2008 2007 2006 2005 2004
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Table 11: 
Summary of Significant Results from Table 10 
Logistic Regression Results: Banks with More than $300 Million in Total Assets 
 
+,- indicate significant (at the 10% level or stronger) positive or negative regression coefficients from the logistic regressions in 
Table 10. + indicates a positive relation with the probability of failure and – indicates a negative relation with the probability of 
failure. 
 
Variable 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004
TE - -
LLR - -
ROA -  - -  
NPA + + + + +
SEC     
BD + + +   
LNSIZE +
CASHDUE - -
GOODWILL +  - -
RER14 -
REMUL + + +
RECON + + + + +
RECOM + +
CI  - -
CONS -
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Table 12:  
Logistic Regression Results: Banks with Less than $300 Million in Total Assets 
Results from estimating a logistic regression model to explain determinants of bank failures, where the dependent variable FAIL takes 
on a value of one if a bank failed during 2009 or was technically insolvent at the end of 2009, and a value of zero otherwise. 
Explanatory variables are defined in Table 1. There are 149 failures and 5,231 survivors when we use year-end 2008 data; 147 failures 
and 5,468 survivors when we use year-end 2007 data; 147 failures and 5,554 survivors when we use year-end 2006 data; 157 failures 
and 5,763 survivors when we use year-end 2005 data; and 166 failures and 5,974 survivors when we use year-end 2004 data. 
Technical insolvency is defined as (TE + LLR) < (0.5 x NPA). *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 
levels, respectively. 
 
Marginal Marginal Marginal Marginal Marginal
Variable Effect t-stat  Effect t-stat  Effect t-stat  Effect t-stat  Effect t-stat  
TE -0.724 -7.851 *** -0.22 -4.02 *** 0 0.11 0.01 0.35 0.05 1.97 **
LLR -0.220 -0.945 -0.24 -0.52 -1.4 -2.43 ** -1.65 -2.56 ** -1.63 -2.39 **
ROA -0.256 -3.102 *** -0.53 -3.35 *** -0.34 -2.63 *** -0.37 -2.32 ** -0.24 -2.21 **
NPA 0.376 9.297 *** 0.34 5.49 *** 0.48 5.36 *** 0.39 3.35 *** 0.21 1.61
SEC -0.065 -2.670 *** -0.02 -0.72 -0.05 -1.99 ** -0.07 -2.63 *** -0.06 -2.45 **
BD 0.047 3.480 *** 0.05 2.86 *** 0.05 3.07 *** 0.00 0.78 0.09 4.56 ***
LNSIZE 0.001 0.468 0.00 -0.36 0 0.05 0.00 0.51 0.00 0.84
CASHDUE -0.095 -2.262 ** 0.00 -0.07 -0.02 -0.51 -0.13 -1.97 ** -0.06 -1.19
GOODWILL 0.584 3.471 *** 0.27 2.46 ** 0.04 0.41 -0.09 -0.61 -0.07 -0.49
RER14 -0.094 -3.982 *** -0.03 -0.95 -0.04 -1.35 -0.01 -0.54 -0.01 -0.43
REMUL 0.070 1.556 0.12 2.66 *** 0.14 2.67 *** 0.12 2.45 ** 0.14 2.57 **
RECON 0.060 2.977 *** 0.17 7.45 *** 0.17 8.47 *** 0.18 8.40 *** 0.18 8.30 ***
RECOM -0.017 -0.967 0.06 2.45 ** 0.05 2.54 ** 0.06 2.51 ** 0.05 2.13 **
CI -0.055 -2.030 ** 0.02 0.71 0.03 0.99 0.03 1.14 0.04 1.47
CONS -0.051 -0.903 -0.07 -0.93 -0.07 -1.02 -0.12 -1.51 -0.07 -1.25
Pseudo-R2 0.595 0.369 0.268 0.213 0.198
Failures 149         147         147         157         166         
Survivors 5,231      5,468      5,554      5,763      5,974      
Obs. 5,380      5,615      5,701      5,920      6,140      
2008 2007 2006 2005 2004
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Table 13: 
Summary of Significant Results from Table 12 
Logistic Regression Results: Banks with Less than $300 Million in Total Assets 
 
+, - indicate significant (at the 10% level or stronger) positive or negative regression coefficients from the logistic regressions in 
Table 12. + indicates a positive relation with the probability of failure and – indicates a negative relation with the probability of 
failure. 
Variable 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004
TE - - +
LLR - - -
ROA - - - - -
NPA + + + +
SEC -  - - -
BD + + +  +
LNSIZE
CASHDUE - -
GOODWILL + +  
RER14 -
REMUL + + + +
RECON + + + + +
RECOM + + + +
CI -  - -
CONS
 
 
